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the top management posts has protectionist features in all the cases. As for the general tendencies of 
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Introduction
An enterprise may be viewed as an institute 
of mobility, a very important one that to a great 
degree determines social class differences in 
industrial and late-industrial society (Bell, 1973). 
Western sociology, economy and management 
have the long-standing tradition of studying 
intrafirm mobility: the processes analyzed by 
economists within the framework of the concept 
of the internal labour market are studied in 
sociology as processes of intraorganizational 
mobility: its factors, trajectories, and the ascent 
opportunities of its staff (Doeringer et al., 1971; 
Bartunek et al., 2008). 
The “old” Russian enterprises that existed 
prior to the economic reforms of the 1990s, 
“inherited” the Soviet system of labour relations 
with its patronizing, the practice of “lifelong” 
employment, and prevalence of non-financial 
mechanisms of labour incentives. But the 
restructuring that all more or less successful 
modern enterprises had to go through under 
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the influence of “market pressure” has actually 
changed the “rules of the game” in the internal 
labour market. 
In the past two decades the development 
of Russian enterprises has undergone a number 
of periods: 1. survival; 2. adaptation to work in 
market conditions; 3. developing or maintaining 
the achieved positions. During each of them we can 
discover specific changes of intraorganizational 
mobility. So, the objects of study in this paper 
are the interaction of restructuring processes and 
changes in the internal labour markets and, as a 
result, the flow of intrafirm mobility.
Materials and Methods
The research has been carried out in 
accordance with case study methodology, in 
addition to which various methods of collecting 
information were used: analysis of documents 
that pertain to personnel policy, the development 
strategy of an enterprise; the formation and 
analysis of the data base on personnel ascents 
as they are reflected in personnel department 
documentation; in-depth interviews with 
managers of various levels and sectors, with rank-
and-file employees; structured interviews with 
selected employees that represent the enterprise 
structure.
The reasons for choosing certain 
enterprises were the following: all of them 
were established in the Soviet period and in 
the 2000s underwent important organizational 
and managerial restructuring. We have chosen 
two “old” Ural enterprises as the subject of 
our research. These two enterprises belong 
to different industry branches and this factor 
enables us to name them “Khimzavod” 
(chemical factory) and “Mashzavod” (machine-
building factory). 
Both factories were established in 
the 1940s-50s and have a lot in common. 
Manpower at these enterprises does not 
exceed the average, numbering not more than 
1000 people. To note, both enterprises have 
decreased the number of personnel compared 
to the Soviet period – now there are from 4 to 5 
times less employees. This factor is connected 
with the depression that took place in the early 
mid-1990s. However, today these factories 
have been modernized, at any rate, we see 
many attributes of “advanced” management: 
significant effort and means have been put 
into investment and purchasing of up-to-date 
machinery, the enterprises have been certified 
with ISO, their top management has been 
trained at new business schools etc.
Both factories began their active 
development period in the early 2000s together 
with the Russian economy, but the conditions 
for this development had begun to form earlier: 
it was in the early 1990s that both enterprises 
introduced a number of managerial innovations 
that can be conventionally called “a turn towards 
the market”, which actually was the beginning 
of a significant restructuring process. But these 
processes and their consequences, including 
those that occur at the internal labour market, 
turned out to be absolutely different in the two 
factories that have been studied. 
From the present research point of view, it 
is a great luck that our analysis enabled us to 
describe two different restructuring models, 
two different approaches to how “the Soviet 
legacy” can be transformed. One of the options 
(Mashzavod) gave us an example of an attempt 
to combine a “market” orientation and an 
updated management structure with what was 
in fact the Soviet system of labour relations 
and, in particular, a model of the internal labour 
market. The other variant (Khimzavod) totally 
rejected Soviet practice and actively introduced 
Western management set-ups with their practice 
of internal ascent, evaluation and incentives for 
employees.
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Results
Ascent of employees in the internal labour 
market takes place along two main axes of 
mobility: professional (career) and the economic 
one (which means pay changes) (Mayer et al., 
1987). As a mobility institution, an enterprise 
may be viewed in two aspects: structurally, from 
the point of view of the ascent possibilities that 
it provides, which are the number of positions, 
their complexity and the multi-layered structure 
of management and the posts to be held there, 
plus its dynamics. Secondly, an enterprise may 
be viewed as a field of formation and action of 
rules that regulate the ascent of its employees 
(Burton et al., 2007). To be more precise, who 
is to be selected for promotion, what personal or 
professional criteria are important for ascent in 
the internal labour market, what the employees 
may be punished or dismissed for. Some of 
these rules are fixed formally while others are 
formed by everyday practice of interaction that 
determines the chances of intraorganizational 
mobility for each employee.
Speaking about the structure of the factories 
that have been studied, on the whole, it is similar. 
Both enterprises have a three-level management 
structure with linear management on the lowest 
level (foreman, team-leader), medium-level 
management (shop and sector managers) and 
top management. Functional division is typical: 
production is separated from the sales and the 
administrative sections, and there is a division 
into the main production process and the 
subsidiary services.
It is of interest to note that in the process 
of restructuring both factories tried in a greater 
or lesser degree to introduce elements of matrix 
structure. Khimzavod introduced divisional 
structure with a certain degree of independence 
for the divisions by letting them have their own 
sales sector and index of economic effectiveness. 
Later, however, the idea was abandoned. 
Mashzavod went even further by forming 
independent juristic units out of some of the 
sectors, but leaving the a common internal labour 
market, so that managers could move from one 
enterprise to another, and new managers could 
be recruited from “neighbouring” structures, 
this being the usual practice. In the long run 
the institutional framework of mobility at the 
enterprises is determined by the traditional 
hierarchic structure built along functional lines.
The management structure of this type to 
a great degree determines the specificity of the 
internal labour market at Russian factories: the 
presence of a barrier between the production 
and the non-production sectors is one of their 
features. One can actually speak about different 
labour markets for each of these categories of 
employees, where internal mobility, as a rule, is 
limited by the framework of its own professional 
group that occupies certain posts.
A configuration of management structure 
such as this gives the widest career possibilities 
for the employees of the main production 
sector. To begin with, it is connected with the 
longest “staircase” that includes qualification 
competence categories and possibility of 
growth along the “team-leader – foreman / shift 
foreman – shop manager” line. One spectacular 
example for Mashzavod is the following: a person 
began his career in 1974, became a foreman in 
the Soviet period, then after graduating became 
a shop manager. In the 1990s when many people 
quit the factory, those young managers who were 
able to work in the new conditions got promoted. 
Our protagonist became a deputy head manager 
of production and monitored one of the main 
production lines. Then he continued to hold this 
post when the production line became a separate 
branch. He has been holding this post up to 
this day. Another example of typical career for 
Khimzavod is the following: a person came to the 
factory in 2001, at a quite young age (40). Got 
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employed as a qualified worker, but it is worth 
nothing that he had higher education and working 
experience in the military sphere. The next year 
he got promoted to a higher post; he became a 
medium-level manager (bypassing the linear 
management stage), the latest reorganization 
brought him the post of deputy director-general. 
Our studies revealed such career growths, both 
in the Soviet period and recent time. However, a 
rather significant difference between the factories 
has been noticed. Mashzavod has quite a number 
of such “old” careers, whereas Khimzavod has 
more new ones.
The enterprises that have been studied 
have good mobility chances for the production 
personnel due to the specificity of their sphere of 
work: as we have already noted, both enterprises 
underwent difficulties when searching for 
production specialists in the external labour 
market. That is why both factories deliberately 
stimulate internal mobility of the main production 
personnel by introducing specialized programs 
to stimulate development of these workers: a 
personnel reserve (Khimzavod) and support for 
the young employees (Mashzavod). 
In addition to the vertical mobility, which is 
rather limited for this category of employees, we 
can make note of the privileged position of the 
highly qualified production personnel. They are 
instructed, so they feel that they are important 
and valued.
As a result, it is the production personnel that 
are mobile, especially at Khimzavod. Analysis of 
the database of the personnel department sheds 
light on some certain tendencies of internal 
mobility of various categories of employees. The 
maximum mobility level was noted in the main 
production sectors of Khimzavod – 70.4 % of the 
employees of these sectors survived the upheavals 
of the 2000s. Mashzavod shows a similar tendency 
but with a bit less mobility – 52.6 % (see Table 1). 
However, at both factories half of the transfers of 
workers have to do with ascent.
At Khimzavod the system of giving 
the workers a higher rank is of a regular and 
systematized nature – each year they go through 
a planned qualification competence test, which 
includes a theoretical exam and a task, with 
their immediate superiors and colleagues giving 
them references. If the result of the qualification 
competence test is good they may be given a higher 
rank: “If you want to raise your qualification level 
here, you have at least to pass a test. This testing 
enables you to apply for a higher rank. And of 
course then you will be paid more” (worker, 
Khimzavod).
Table 1. Mobility level of personnel at the factories from 2000 to 2009*.
KHIMZAVOD МASHZAVOD
Mobility  % 
of the sector 
employees
Number of 
transfers per one 
mobile person
Mobility  % 
of the sector 
employees
Number of 
transfers per one 
mobile person
The total of the factory 
employees 47,5 1,8 41,4 1,9
Main production process 70,4 1,7 52,6 1,9
Subsidiary production process 29,9 1,2 21,6 1,8
Specialists in administrative 
sectors 35,0 1,4 46,8 2,0
* According to the study of the employees’ personal records, the material from the personnel department, only 
the vertical transfers were recorded when a person occupied a new post, or received another category or rank (for 
workers).
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Mashzavod has no system of testing 
qualification competence, but you can apply for 
a higher rank: “we have a tariff and qualification 
commission, it gives you a rank and the certain 
rank of each person is confirmed” (worker, 
Mashzavod). Here we may point out that in the 
crisis conditions the ranks rise is not stimulated, 
it is even impeded. That means that, theoretically, 
such a possibility does exist, but in practice ranks 
are not raised: “A test in qualification competence 
is a motivation: if you go through it you raise your 
rank and your salary. At present the enterprise 
has no such possibility. On the contrary, the 
task is to reduce wages” (head of personnel 
department, Mashzavod).
One more category mobile personnel:  
the specialists
Mashzavod is the place where specialists 
have good mobility opportunities. One can see 
a clearly protectionist position towards young 
specialists there. This trend is a deliberate policy, 
which began to show itself in the early 2000s, 
when ageing of personnel at the enterprise became 
a problem. It was at that time that the decision 
to attract and keep young specialists was taken. 
The management was looking for them among 
school leavers, a special program to support the 
young specialists had been created (this fact has 
already been mentioned). “Rapid” career ascent 
is a characteristic for young specialists who came 
to this factory. Here is an example: a manager of 
construction sector came to the factory while still 
a student in 2004 as engineer-constructor. Ascent 
due to his activity and high motivation, he was 
a good organizer: “the first time I was promoted 
because… the sector manager that had been here 
before me needed some kind of administrative 
help with the interaction issues. He was more of 
a man of science… so he made me his assistant, 
so I got a new post, I became a deputy sector 
manager. After that it all went naturally, I had 
to look into quite a number of questions, to go 
to business trips, work with clients, etc.” This 
example is possibly the most striking, but it is 
quite typical for enterprises – the 2000s saw a 
great number of managers being changed. For 
some of them these transfers turned out to be 
rather intensive – when the sectors got separated 
and became branches of the enterprise these 
people became their directors (as in the case with 
the electronic advertising sector, the IT sector). 
It is significant that restructuring opened up new 
possibilities for specialists’ careers – the sectors 
were reorganized, some directions of work and 
the sectors that went with them were developed, 
they grew in size and it was in these conditions 
that the young and energetic specialists ascended. 
However, as the employees thought, this period 
came to an end very quickly, and at present the 
“top position” for the specialists is that of a 
sector manager: “at that period when we had all 
those reorganizations, there were possibilities 
for career growth, but now, during the last 
2 years… I have a feeling that “the green light” 
has somehow faded. Actually that’s true, because 
reorganizations have stopped” (sector manager, 
Mashzavod). 
The attitude towards specialists at Khimzavod 
is quite different – they are not viewed by the 
management as a social policy priority: we have 
personnel with a standard qualification – lawyers, 
accountants. They do not interest us too much at 
the moment. We are interested in the production 
personnel” (top manager, Khimzavod). Besides 
that, there is a practice of hiring sector managers 
from the outside, the same goes for managers of 
non-production branches (personnel department, 
sales department, financial department, etc.). 
This means that career possibilities for specialists 
working at the enterprise are from the very start 
limited because they are excluded from contests to 
occupy vacant posts of sector managers. The same 
goes for the sector managers themselves because 
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they see no perspectives of growth. One of the 
departments of the enterprise may be cited as an 
example: sector manager, who had been working 
for the enterprise since 2003, was accepted to the 
post of manager. Prior to that he had taken part in 
the reorganization of the factory as a consultant, 
and was taken on when the work on the project 
had been over. There are constant changes in 
the sector staff. The hiring policy is about new 
specialists without work experience being chosen 
from the external labour market, so that their 
pay is low. Nobody does anything to make them 
more loyal to the enterprise, the management is 
indifferent to the constant change of employees 
in the sector: “young girls were taken on as 
economists, sometimes without any experience 
whatsoever… their salary was low, but that’s how 
they learned, they acquired experience. In about 
three years’ time they quit, some stayed longer, 
they quit and found better-paid jobs”
Thus we see that intrafirm mobility for 
the specialists at the enterprises that have been 
studied is quite at variance: at Mashzavod there is 
a stronger tendency towards internal employment 
of sector managers and career growth for 
specialists is stimulated. At Khimzavod, on the 
other hand, professional ascent for specialists is 
considerably limited both by the general attitude 
of the management towards this category of 
personnel and by the practice of employing 
sector managers from the outside. The result is 
clearly seen in the transfer statistics (see Table 2): 
at Mashzavod. In the 2000s, practically half the 
specialists changed their posts, with one mobile 
person having about two transfers. At Khimzavod 
change of posts was recorded only for a third of 
the specialists, the average number of transfers 
being 1.4. It is important to note that for this 
category of personnel career possibilities are 
valuable from the professional point of view, and 
it can be used as criterion for evaluating the place 
of work, as our research shows: at Mashzavod it is 
the specialists who are to a great degree satisfied 
with their work (85 % are satisfied or almost 
satisfied). At Khimzavod the specialists are less 
satisfied than the production personnel and the 
reason they give is low salary and the absence of 
growth perspectives within the enterprise (this 
reason was given as the main one by 1/5 of the 
specialists).
Workers of the subsidiary sphere of 
production are at the periphery of the internal 
labour market.
Both studied enterprises actually do not 
see this category of personnel as of interest for 
the personnel policy they pursue. Of course, 
this category of personnel also has some level of 
mobility (see Table 1), but it is much lower than 
in the other sectors, and transfers are usually 
connected with the fact that tariffs for certain 
posts become higher, though responsibilities are 
not much altered due to ascent.
To pass over from the structural conditions 
of intraorganizational mobility to rules and 
norms that are regulated by the internal labour 
market, first of all it is necessary to stop on the 
system of remuneration, of bonuses and their 
absence. The common factor for both enterprises 
in this sphere is the differentiation in the ways of 
fixing incentives for the production and the non-
production personnel, as well as innovations in 
the sphere of remunerations that are, by the way, 
directed towards the solution of certain set tasks.
Traditionally, in both factories the workers 
and the specialists were paid by the hour with 
a permanent unchangeable part being paid 
regularly according to the tariff or a person got 
paid for the post he/she held, plus the bonus. 
The ratio of the permanent part and the bonus 
in different sectors was different. What was 
common for all was that bonuses were paid 
without the real results of work being taken into 
account. Bonuses were withheld only if rules of 
discipline were seriously broken.
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In the period of adaptation to the new 
conditions of the market both factories reviewed 
their methods of payment, this factor mainly 
concerned the production personnel. The aim 
had not changed – the quality of work still served 
as an incentive, but organizationally the two 
factories solved it in different ways.
Khimzavod is introducing the KPI system, 
a system of indexes, which helps to differentiate 
the amount of the bonus: “quality, output, wastes 
and discipline, before we had simply the bonus. 
The amount depended on the output and what 
was agreed upon when they took you on, for this 
category you got so much, for that one that much” 
(foreman, Khimzavod). The new system of pay 
changes the relations within the internal labour 
market, because it leads to greater economic 
inequality. Theoretically, now the worker can 
influence the level of his/her remuneration. But 
there is a disadvantage: most of the workers don’t 
understand what this new system of payment is 
all about. At any rate right now only 1/3 of the 
workers in the main production sphere (linear 
managers, mostly) can definitely say that they 
understand it. On one hand, the situation is typical 
when innovations are introduced, on the other 
hand, the system is really complicated – there 
are several indexes, each of them having its own 
significance for the amount the bonuses amount. 
In other words, its transparency and convenience, 
so obvious to the managers, is incomprehensible 
to the workers and their perception of it as being 
fair is still a big question.
When the new system of payment was 
introduced at Khimzavod, the deprived category 
of employees was again the specialists. They do 
not feel that their salary depends on the results 
of their work: “we have always had a system of 
fixed payment, last year they decided to work out 
a system of motivation for each post, they thought 
a bit and worked it out, but it has not been 
introduced” (manager of economic department, 
Khimzavod). Most specialists (actually one in 
four) feel that their pay does not correspond to 
their qualification and the effort they put into 
their work. One exception is the sales department 
where the motivation system is clearly defined: 
“we all have corporate bonuses that are aimed 
at definite set tasks. In addition to corporate 
bonuses, we all like to go bowling, which is also a 
part of it” (sales manager, Khimzavod).
Bonuses for top managers include the 
corporate share (if the sales plan has been 
fulfilled by 96 %), and a part of the bonus is for 
your personal gains – participation in projects, for 
example. Besides, combining posts is stimulated, 
so are refresher courses, knowledge of English, 
etc.
Starting from the 2000s Mashzavod has also 
tried to connect the workers’ wages in the main 
production sphere to the quality of their labour. 
Actually the system is very simple – you might 
be deprived of your bonus if there are problems 
with quality of the commodities produced, a fact 
that is registered by the Section of Technical 
Control, or if the clients complain. “Our bonus is 
practically 40 % of our wages, 20 % of which is 
for the production plan and some other functions, 
and 20 % is for quality. People have got so used 
to it that it is almost like set wages, something 
you get automatically. People are very seldom 
deprived of their bonus, as a rule… it’s either the 
product does not pass technical control or the 
client does not accept it, when it happens that 
the workers are punished” (production manager, 
Mashzavod).
That is, the system of paying bonuses to 
workers does not add any differentiations in 
wages to the traditional one where wages are set 
according to the rank. But here, as in some other 
fields, Mashzavod has a non-formalized system, 
which is a fund for bonuses with the bonuses 
being distributed by the direct manager of the 
worker. “We are allowed to use a small part of the 
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whole volume of production. That is, we send the 
made product to the warehouse, the percentage 
is counted, and we are, say, given 30 000 rubles, 
so we use this money to pay for the overtime and 
other motivations are compensated this way as 
well” (production manager, Mashzavod).
Until recent time, the specialists used to 
have a similar system of receiving bonuses, but 
in 2009 it was changed in the non-production 
sectors and now it depends on the work results: 
20 % is for corporate results, that is, whether or 
not the factory has received any financial assets; 
10 % for the results the sector has achieved, which 
actually means that the work at hand is to be done 
thoroughly and evenly, without interruptions. To 
speak the truth, this type of bonus system does 
not stimulate anyone, it is an undercover to lower 
the salary of the specialists in crisis conditions 
when the sales are not too high. That is how 
quite a number of specialists see it: “the factory 
managers are deprived of bonuses more often 
than are the production personnel. And mind that 
they use indexes that they can’t really influence. 
That is how the bonus system with sales as the 
criterion looks: quite a number of people are 
“tied” to them, they can’t exert any influence on 
the amount that is sold” (manager of economics 
department, Mashzavod).
Thus, at the stage of reorganization, which we 
call “adaptation to the market”, both factories began 
to change their system of payment and bonuses, 
while trying to solve the problem of quality control 
of the goods produced and (secondly) to stimulate 
the personnel. On the whole, the system of payment 
becomes more market-oriented as it starts to 
depend on whether or not the client is satisfied, as 
well as on the sales.
As the other issues are concerned, Khimzavod 
follows the path of maximum formalization and 
systematization of the process. At Khimzavod a 
lot remains on the level of “manual” management 
and depends on medium-level managers. Both 
factories, however, don’t have enough time to 
put their innovations into practice, partly due 
to the crisis, and partly due to the negative way 
the personnel views the changes. As a result, the 
switchover to new payment methods does not in 
effect exert any influence on the development of 
the internal labour market.
Changes in payment exert much greater 
influence on internal mobility – it is this factor 
that is viewed by the employees as a rise in 
status, as positive dynamics. As it was shown in 
the survey of the enterprises personnel, almost 
all employees of the factories noticed a rise in 
wages during the last three years. At Khimzavod 
the peak was reached in 2007. This year was the 
last when a mass planned 15 % increase in pay 
actually took place – this system was in action 
for quite a number of years, but in 2008 it was 
cancelled. Nothing has taken place yet and there 
is no total increase of wages, there are only 
individual changes in the level of payment that 
accompany the movement up the professional 
“staircase” (see Table 2).
Mashzavod has a totally different situation. 
Wages are never raised en masse at the factory. It 
does sometimes happen that wages are increased 
for some sectors, which the employees think is a 
rise for everyone, because they usually compare 
what they get with what their nearest colleagues 
get. It is only the sector managers who know 
the mechanism of wage increases, which in the 
long run depends on the personal decision of 
the director-general: that is, here again we come 
across the combination of the authoritarian style 
of management and of attempts to introduce some 
market-oriented principles of management. “It all 
happens thanks to me, I am the initiator, I write a 
note in which I ask to consider the possibility. In a 
talk with the head engineer I explain everything, 
why it is so. The head engineer either supports 
me or says that it’s of no use now, because it is 
impossible, which means that we put it off till the 
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right moment comes. If there is an opportunity, 
we ask the director-general to make the final 
decision” (production manager, Mashzavod).
In 2008 quite a number of sectors got an 
increase in payment according to this principle.
At the same time individuals could get a rise 
if the manager put in a word for them, it could 
be for some work done or on the initiative of the 
worker if they have the courage to speak up for 
themselves (of course, this can be done only by 
the employees who know what they worth). We 
have come across such cases in our study as well. 
Specialists, workers and managers may be cited 
as examples here.
Thus, employees of both factories more often 
noted increases in wages en masse (“everyone got 
a rise”). A payment increase for some personal 
achievements is seldom recorded. At Khimzavod 
in the last few years such an increase was given 
to many workers of the main sector, along with 
the rank rise. At Mashzavod a rise in payment as 
a result of ascent or for personal achievements 
was felt only by the managers (60 % of this 
group), and much less by the specialists (1/3 of 
the group). At Khimzavod, besides the managers, 
a rise in payment as encouragement of personal 
achievement was noted only by the sales 
specialists.
But on the whole the employees do not 
feel that this differentiation in payment is just. 
At Mashzavod only 15 %, and at Khimzavod 
only 20 % consider the pay for the work they 
do adequate to the effort they exert and to 
their qualification. The problem of whether 
the employees think that they are fairly paid 
or not, and whether they are fairly promoted is 
very important for the formation of the feeling 
of satisfaction by the work that is done, and for 
loyalty to the enterprise. 
One may notice a discrepancy in the way 
norms are reconsidered, those norms that 
regulate social mobility along the axis of income. 
Khimzavod, at least on the level of declarations, 
is oriented towards stimulation of individual 
results, the activeness of the workers. Now that 
it has rejected the system of social benefits, 
and almost all the non-material incentives of 
stimulating the employees, differentiated system 
of payment for the work done and a transparent 
set-up for increasing pay definitely must be 
introduced. However, at present nothing of the 
sort is happening for most categories of workers 
(the only exceptions are managers and sales 
departments).
Meanwhile Mashzavod still retains the 
system of social benefits, and is, on the whole, 
oriented towards the patronizing attitude to 
the personnel, and logically speaking it should 
have retained a uniform system of payment and 
a planned increase of wages en masse. But it 
Table 2. The reason for payment increase – the result of workers’ survey; the percentage of those who claim that 
there was an increase.
Khimzavod Mashzavod
Raising of rank 20,3 2,7
Raising of position 9,5 10,7
Increase in wages for the good quality of my work (rank or 
position not raised) 10,8 16,0
Payment increase for everyone 52,7 61,3
Other reasons 6,7 9,3
Total 100 100
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is here that increase in wages to a great degree 
depends on the initiative of the worker himself or 
his manager, though the final decision, quite in 
the patronizing key, is made personally and at the 
moment considered right by the director-general.
Here we can come to the conclusion that 
restructuring influences the internal labour market 
and intraorganizational mobility is intensified 
more thanks to structural transformations, and 
not due to a targeted personnel policy. Processes 
of intraorganizational mobility are strengthened 
mainly in the periods when important 
technological and organizational changes take 
place, though they always lag behind in time.
At Khimzavod internal mobility increased in 
2005, a year after some new equipment had been 
installed. A typical career during technological 
innovations period: a man came to the factory 
in 2005 as a qualified worker, learned working 
with the new equipment. Production processes 
developed, new people came and they had to be 
taught: “people came, my experience grew, new, 
less experienced people came, automatically I 
became their supervisor. Then there appeared the 
post of colour matcher, we had no ranks then. The 
managers thought up ranks for us, then they came 
up with the senior colour matcher, then I became 
a colour matcher manager, that is the foreman of 
the sector”. At present our protagonist works as 
the sector foreman, this last promotion took place 
in 2008, during the period of highest mobility rate 
at the enterprise. This period may be designated 
as organizational restructuring of production 
processes. An example of career growth at that 
period: a man came to the factory in 2003 as an 
apprentice worker, with higher education and work 
experience on various posts, in a year became head 
of the shift (this may be related to the first period). 
He quit in 2005, went over to a rival company and 
received a much higher post, in 2006 came back 
as a shift manager, in early 2009 was appointed as 
a manager of one of the production branches. “For 
me it was a surprise, I couldn’t even imagine… 
How did it happen? My manager asked me and 
another fellow to come up to his office. We were 
shown in and he said – so and so, gentlemen, the 
party lays its hope on you… Where did those who 
headed this sector go, I don’t know. And I’m not 
really interested. What I have to do is to produce 
a good product, no wastes”
At Mashzavod mobility began in 1999, a fact 
that may be tied to change of director-general and 
transfers of managers and the formation of a new 
team. The second stage of mobility was in 2003 
when organizational restructuring began, which 
turned the enterprise into a holding. Finally, a 
noticeable increase of ascent took place in 2007-
2008, which was connected with the development 
Activity of intraorganizational mobility within various periods of the factories development (1998-2009). Analysis 
of the personal, material from the personnel department. With the change of post, category or rank (for workers) 
only vertical ascent has been recorded
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of new trends and diversification of production. 
We have already mentioned one of the examples 
of career growth in these years – the career of 
a young specialist, manager of the construction 
department. To note, the factor that helped to 
promote him was his active participation in 
bringing a new trend to a commercial level, his 
ability to set up relations with clients. An example 
of a career of the first period: an employee came 
to the factory with higher education and work 
experience as a deputy manager of a sector. In 
1.5-2 years of work the production manager in 
the main production shop was dismissed and 
our protagonist was asked to occupy this post. 
“He [the former manager], most probably had 
done something the director didn’t like, or his 
qualifications were wrong and he was asked to 
leave. Then they decided to try me… Why I was 
chosen, I don’t know. I think it was just that I 
happened to be at hand” (production manager of 
the construction subsector, Mashzavod).
As we see, examples taken from Mashzavod 
and from Khimzavod are very similar. In the 
situation when production is developed and 
technological transformations take place, those 
people who take active part in the innovations 
and can switch over to new formats of work 
are promoted. In situations of structural, 
organizational and managing transformations the 
most important thing is, obviously, education, 
training, work experience, management included, 
even outside the enterprise. The impression is 
made that the factor of “a new man” is important, 
one that is not related to the previous managing 
team, but is loyal to the enterprise.
The specific feature of Mashzavod is that 
they have a team of top managers consisting of 
only a few members, but their internal mobility is 
very high – they are periodically “switched over” 
to take responsibility for new, often numerous 
problems and trends. Here is one very good 
example: at present the deputy director-general 
for production сame together with the new 
director-general from his old place of work. He 
used to work as a manager of sales department. 
Then, when sales began to grow, he became in 
charge for leasing territory, then our protagonist 
was appointed the head accountant (having no 
financial or economic education), then the head 
of personnel department, then again – back into 
the production process
This example (it is not the only one) clearly 
shows that the factor of loyalty to the enterprise 
and personally to the director-general was the key 
one, as well as his ability to work in the team and 
carry out all kinds of managerial tasks.
Conclusion
Western sociology has come up with several 
models of intrafirm mobility, these models of 
mobility depending on the rules and norms that 
determine the ascent of employees within the 
enterprise. Turner (Turner, 1960) pointed out two 
types of intraorganizational mobility: contest 
with its competition of experience and abilities on 
equal terms to occupy the next higher post, and the 
protectionist or sponsored one, when leaders are 
discerned very early and their chances of ascent 
within the organization increase. Rosenbaum 
(Rosenbaum, 1984), who developed these ideas 
and partly combined the models, offered a 
“tournament model”, the essence of which is 
that a career within the organization is based on 
the principle of “a drop-out competition”, where 
everyone has equal chance in the first stage, but 
the next stages are only for those who “win” 
the previous ones. That is, the higher post you 
occupy, the more important is the experience of 
the previous successful positional ascents.
The present study shows the realization of 
both the protectionist and the contest models of 
activity within the organization. 
Recruitment to the top management posts in 
all cases has a protectionist character – loyalty 
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to the enterprise and to the director-general 
personally turns out to be important criteria of 
selection at both enterprises (which, of course, 
does not exclude their being professionals, but it 
certainly limits the opportunity of vertical ascent 
for most employees). This type of model for 
employing “top” managers is fully initiated by 
the directors-general who, on the one hand, want 
to make way for all innovations and, on the other, 
it helps them feel more secure in the situation of 
the risky Russian capitalism.
As for the general tendencies of 
intraorganizational mobility and of transfers to 
positions of linear and medium-level management, 
in the period when enterprises had to survive, as 
we think, the contest model is clearly discerned. 
Partly because the benefits that accompanied 
ascent in the mid-1990s were minimal, those who 
ascended, in essence, were those who were ready 
to work in the severe conditions and were loyal 
to the enterprise. The chances are actually equal. 
This model has been realized in Khimzavod 
since 2004, when active introduction of new 
equipment puts the employees in practically equal 
situations – nobody knows how to work with the 
new equipment and the person who shows more 
interest, flexibility and aptitude towards learning 
is the one who gets promoted.
This model is partly retained in the 
following period of adaptation to the market and 
development when the organizational structure 
is transformed, when initiative and (to a lesser 
degree) experience are valued. But here we see 
that elements of protectionism come to the fore 
in relation to some employees (it is graphically 
seen in Mashzavod), because in the period of 
innovations the most important factor is the 
employee’s loyalty to the enterprise and to the 
top management. Here we see a the tournament 
model – those who have shown themselves to be 
the best in their previous work ascend quicker, 
then they ascend for the second time.
The protectionist model of mobility is 
manifested in conditions when there is a deficit 
in the labour market and it is introduced into the 
personnel policy of factories deliberately. Here we 
mean the program of young specialists’ support at 
Mashzavod and the program of personnel reserve 
at Khimzavod. Those categories of personnel 
that are important for the development of the 
enterprise are being promoted purposefully. The 
suitable people are taken note of at the moment 
when they are still rank-and-file, thus they are 
given chances of mobility. Today at Mashzavod 
where the program has been in progress for 
several years already, we can see examples of 
successful career ascent of young specialists 
whom the protectionist policy helps to keep 
in the enterprise and helps make them loyal to 
the factory. At Khimzavod there are as yet no 
examples of career ascent of representatives of 
the “personnel reserve”, but, obviously, it is a 
matter of time, because the program has only just 
been introduced.
Analysis of transformations in the personnel 
management of industrial enterprises in conditions 
of transitional economy lets us suppose that the 
models of intraorganizational mobility do not 
fully depend on changes in the external labour 
market, demand and supply dynamics or cost 
of manpower in the economy of the region. To 
a much greater degree the logic of development 
of the internal labour market is determined by 
administratively fixed formal and informal rules, 
the practice of labour relations that have formed 
within the enterprise.
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В статье рассматриваются процессы внутриорганизационной мобильности на разных стадиях 
реструктуризации постсоветских предприятий. Статья написана на базе кейс-стади на 
двух уральских заводах и рассматривает предприятие как институт мобильности. В центре 
внимания – изменения должностной структуры и правил продвижения в ней (как формальных, 
так и неформальных), которые меняются в ходе адаптации предприятия к рынку. Как показало 
наше исследование, модели внутренней мобильности предприятия, развитие внутреннего 
рынка лишь отчасти зависят от изменений на внешнем рынке труда, динамики спроса и 
предложения и стоимости рабочей силы в экономике региона. В гораздо большей степени 
логику развития внутреннего рынка труда определяют формальные, административно 
закрепленные и неформальные правила, практики трудовых отношений, сложившиеся на 
предприятиях. Мы обнаружили, что на предприятиях реализуется протекционистская 
и конкурентная модели мобильности. Рекрутирование на позиции топ-менеджмента во 
всех случаях носит протекционистский характер. Что касается внутриорганизационной 
мобильности в целом, то в кризисные периоды преобладает конкурентная модель, в периоды 
развития и стабильности начинает проявляться и все более распространяться потекционизм 
или, как вариант, модель турнира. 
Авторы благодарят Европейскую комиссию за финансовую поддержку, предоставленную 
в рамках проекта «Экономические и социальные последствия реструктуризации в России и 
Украине».
Ключевые слова: внутриорганизационная мобильность, внутрифирменная мобильность, 
внутренний рынок труда, профессиональная мобильность.
